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IN THE SUPRE1\1E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. FRANK SEVY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE FARM BUREAU 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 





This appeal is taken from a Judgment entered in favor 
of the plaintiff in the sum of $1446.92 with interest thereon 
from March 31, 1956 entered by the Honorable John C. Sevy, 
Jr., on April 25, 1958 in the Sixth Judicial District of the State 
of Utah in and for Garfield County. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about March 25th or 26th of 1956, the plaintiff 
in this action, Mr. T. Frank Sevy, was delivered a 1955 Pontiac 
by one George Talbot, who was the sales representative of 
Pearson & Crofts, an automobile dealership in Richfield, Utah 
and Panguitch, Utah. The testimony is that Mr. T. Frank Sevy 
resides in Panguitch and that he had two automobiles, one 
being a 1949 Pontiac and the other a 1951 Chevrolet Pick up. 
It further appears that on or about March 27, 1956, one Von 
Davis, a representative of Pearson and Crofts, together with 
George Talbot, called at the residence of the plaintiff and 
negotiated for the purchase of a 1955 Pontiac automobile. It 
further appears that on this occasion certain documents were 
signed and later endorsed by the parties and sale of the auto-
mobile was consummated at that time. 
Mr. Sevy carried his insurance with the defendant com-
pany and appellant herein and his testimony is that he in-
formed Von Davis and George Talbot that he wanted to keep 
his insurance with the Farm Bureau Insurance Company. 
Shortly thereafter the testimony is that there was a dis-
cussion as to the paint on the 1955 Pontiac automobile and 
also the seat covers and it was agreed by and between the 
parties that the Pearson and Crofts Company would paint the 
automobile and also replace the seat covers and clean the car 
as agreed between the parties. It further appears that on that 
occasion that Von Davis was then given the 1955 Pontiac auto-
mobile to drive to Richfield for the purpose of installing the 
seat covers and taking care of the paint job as agreed. While 
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--
en route to Richfield, Utah, the auomobile was wrecked and 
this action brought after said accident. 
The testimony is also to the effect that the plaintiff in-
formed Mr. James Yardly, the representative for the appellant 
in the Panguitch area, that he had purchased another car and 
wanted his insurance transferred to the other car on the eve-
ning of March 2 7. 
Subsequent to the 195 5 automobile being wrecked it ap-
pears further that another 1955 Pontiac was sold to the plaintiff 
shortly after the automobile was wrecked. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO PROVE THE ALLEGED DAMAGE TO THE AUTO-
MOBILE OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO PROVE THE ALLEGED DAMAGE TO THE AUTO-
MOBILE OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
The burden of proof that is placed on the plaintiff suing 
for damages to a motor vehicle using the cost of repairs is as 
follows: 
1. The necessity for repairs as a result of the injury. 
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2. That the repairs made were reasonably proper to be 
made; and 
3. That the cost thereof was reasonable. 
This character of proof should fully develop the pertinent 
facts. 5a Am. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Sec. 
1114, p. 950; also see City of Oklahoma City vs. Wilcoxson, 
48 P. (2d) 1039, 1043 (1935). 
In conjunction with the above stated rule as to damages 
see the annotation of cases in 169 A.L.R. pp 1107-1111. On 
page 1111, we find the following: 
"COST OF REPAIR AS ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF 
DAMAGE. 
The use of the cost of repairs as the measure of damage 
is often expressly recognized as an alternative to the right 
to recover the difference is the reasonable market value of the 
car before and after the accident. 
Thus, in Parilli v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (1932) 236 App. 
Div. 577, 260 NYS 60, the court said: "There are alternative 
methods of making punitive damages sustained where per-
sonal property has been injured. The proper and simple method 
is to prove the amount of lessened market value or the 
difference in the value of the property immediately preceding 
and following the wrong ... An alternative method is a proof 
of repair value of the necessary repairs made to restore it as 
nearly as possible to its original condition." The court con-
tinues: ''Of course, there must be pt·oof that the t·epairs were 
necessary and wet"e reasonable worth the sum paid, for with-
out it neither the t'alue of the repairs tZor the extent of the 
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injury is thereby established . . . It is not sufficient to make 
proof of the amount paid.n (Italics ours.) 
These then being the essential elements of proof required 
of the plaintiff, the next question, of course, is whether or 
not the evidence adduced was sufficient to prove the damages 
claimed. 
In the instant case there is only one witness who made 
any remarks about damages or the amount thereof. That was 
Mr. Von Davis. The plaintiff failed to introduce any docu-
mentary evidence as to how much specific damage was done 
to the car; whether the injury complained of was entirely 
caused by the accident, or that the repairs were reasonable. 
The testimony was further that Pearson and Crofts was the 
only place an estimate was obtained and, as claimed by the 
defendant, were, in fact, the owners of the car pursuant to 
the later transactions of the plaintiff on the purchase of an-
other 1955 Pontiac automobile. Hence, it is perfectly obvious 
that Pearson and Crofts could have placed the estimate at any 
figure they so desired. 
In any event the plaintiff failed to show by any evidence, 
documentary or otherwise, that the repairs were reasonable 
and that they were reasonably proper to be made. 
What capacity does Von Davis have with Pearson & 
Croft? Mr. Davis (R. 45) testified that he is the sales manager 
for Pearson & Croft and that he was with George Talbot, 
a salesman for Pearson & Croft in Panguitch, Utah, when the 
plaintiff purchased the 1955 automobile that was wrecked. He 
does not testify that he is a mechanic; that he himself ap-
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praised the damaged car; that he knew it to be reasonable, or 
that he had any knowledge about the amount of the bill except 
that an appraisal was made by someone. He was allowed to 
testify as to the amount arrived at by a third person. In fact, 
it was complete hearsay on the part of the witness Von Davis, 
that an appraisal was prepared and that he knew anything 
it (R. 59). The record further discloses that all of his testi-
mony was objected to by counsel for the appellant as not having 
a proper foundation and certainly that it was hearsay. 
We find on page 58-59 of the transcript as follows: 
"Q. Now, in regard to the damage to the 1955 Pontiac, 
you testified that after it was damaged it was taken 
to Pearson & Crofts; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any appraisement made of those dam-
ages? 
A. Yes, a repair . . . 
BY MR. CHARLIER: Just answer yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Yes, there was an appraisal is your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after that appraisement was made of the dam-
ages, what was done with it? 
A. The car was stored. 
Q. I mean, what was done with the appraisal? 
A. The appraisal was sent to the Farm Bureau Insur-
ance Company in Salt Lake City. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the total amount of that appraisal? 
BY MR. CHARLIER: We will object to that, Your 
Honor. 
A. $1446. 
BY MR. CHARLIER: Just a minute. 
BY THE COURT: What's that? 
BY MR. OLSEN: The total amount of the appraisal 
sent by him to their company. 
BY MR. CHARLIER: We object, there's no founda-
tion. 
BY THE COURT: Objection overruled if he knows. 
A. $1446.92. 
Q. Could you tell the Court where that appraisal was 
prepared? 
A. The appraisal was prepared in our garage by our 
mechanic and itemized-each operation was item-
ized. 
Q. Now, would you explain to the Court a little fur-
ther how these appraisals were worked out, how 
you itemized those things, in what manner? 
A. All operation changes, as replace the right door, 
glass replacing, the right rear fender, replace the 
radiator, all operations are itemized and if the part 
is replaced, the cost of replacement, the cost of the 
new part, the new part is put on the estimate and, 
also, the labor if a damaged part is to be repaired, 
the amount of repair is put on. Each operation that 
it takes to repair the automobile." 
Von Davis, himself, did not make the estimate and cer-
tainly the court erred in allowing him to testify as to the repair 
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because a proper foundation was not laid and it was complete 
hearsay on his part. It was certainly not within the witness's 
own knowledge as to the reasonableness of the repairs or 
whether or not they were necessary and properly a conse-
quence of this particular accident and certainly such evidence 
should not be admitted. He failed to testify about the particular 
damage to this car and speaks in generalities. 
The law is clear that a witness must be properly qualified 
as an expert in order to be competent to testify as to the reason-
able value of repairs or their costs. 
Bailey vs. Ford, 145 A. 85, 127 S.E. 821 ( 1927). 
Moore vs. Levy, 128 Cal. App. 687, 18 P. 2d 362 ( 1933). 
We further find in the case of Spaulding Manufacturing 
Company vs. Holliday, 32 Okla. 823, 124 P. 35, 36 (1912): 
"Matters capable of proof should not be left to con-
jecture. Verdict should be based upon evidence, but 
not upon guess work, especially concerning things so 
easily capable of proof." 
It has been held in many cases and also found in Vol. 6 of 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice in 
Section 3430 as follows: 
"Testimony as to the value of repairs by the witness 
when he did not testify to the necessity of the repairs 
covered by the estimate, nor to the accuracy of his 
estimated value, is mere hearsay." 
Clearly this is exactly what happened in this case and Mr. 
Von Davis at no time was qualified to testify as to the value 
of the repairs; that the repairs were made necessary as a result 
of the accident; nor that the value of the repairs was reason-
10 
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able. Hence, it follows that they were merely statements that 
are hearsay on the part of the witness and the plaintiff has 
clearly failed to establish any damages in this case. 
Also see Edwards vs. Maryland Motor Car Insurance 
Company, 197 N.Y.S. 460, 204 App. Div. 174 (1922). 
The purported bill that Mr. Von Davis referred to while 
on the stand, but was never introduced into evidence, during 
the entirety of his testimony being objected to by counsel for 
the appellant, necessarily follows that no damages were suf-
ficient! y proven by the plaintiff. Based on such evidence if the 
court were to allow the testimony of Von Davis as to the 
appraisal of the repairs of this car to stand with nothing else, 
it would indeed be a dangerous practice. The law certainly 
tequires more evidence as to the exact damages incurred in 
this matter and certainly they were easily obtainable from 
the Pearson & Crofts Dealership, but the record is completely 
devoid of any documentary proof which would sustain the 
damages in this action. Clearly the law requires absolute 
certainty of observation or statements by a witness giving an 
opinion. See 20 Am. Jur., Section 768. 
It has been held on many occasions that a mere general 
statement that is vague and indefinite will not justify a verdict 
for damages. See Smith vs. Calley et al., 284 P. 974 (1930). 
In the Smith case it is held that damages must be proven and 
if they are not proven then of course the trial court has no way 
to measure the damages and as such damages will not be 
awarded to the plaintiff and they would be entitled to nominal 
damages only. 
The same reasoning is found in the case of Moore vs. Levy, 
11 
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supra, wherein we find the following quotation from Corpus 
Juris and found on page 365 of said case to be as follows: 
"Competent evidence of the cost of repairs may be 
admitted, and one who is qualified from his proved 
experience to be a judge of the amount ordinarily 
charged at the usual and market rates for thework and 
material necessary to repair a motor vehicle, and who 
supervised the making of repairs upon the vehicle in 
question is a competent witness as to the reasonable 
cost thereof, evidence of the amount expended for 
repairs is admissible only as it may bear upon the rea-
sonable cost of those reasonably proper and necessary, 
but the actual cost of repairs may be shown in con-
nection with evidence that such cost was reasonable, 
and a bill for repairs may be admitted to prove the 
reasonable cost, when there is testimony to the effect 
that the items contained therein are correct and that 
the charges therefore are all just and proper, but not 
in the absence thereof. If a repair bill merely identified 
by the management of a shop who made the repairs 
who did not supervise them, or have any personal 
knowledge thereof, is not admissible. It is error to ad-
mit testimony to the cost of repairs other than those 
shown to be due to the injuries complained of." 42 
Corpus Juris Section 1297. 
Clearly this is the standard that the law requires in order 
for a plaintiff to set forth the damages he has received as a 
result of an accident. It is obvious from the testimony in this 
case that the plaintiff has failed to meet this burden and the 
witness Von Davis has no reasonable way to ascertain the 
damage caused to the 1955 Pontiac that was sold to T. Frank 
Sevy. It necessarily follows that since he cannot testify as to 
these elements the court had insufficient evidence before it 
to award damages to the plaintiff. 
12 
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The court does not have any standard whatsoever by 
which to base the damages involved in this case and as such 
the court should, based on the evidence, enter only an award 
of nominal damages against this defendant. 
It has been stated in Moore vs. Daggett, 150 A. 538, 129 
Me. 162 (1930), that in event there is no evidence on which 
to base damages properly, only nominal damages can be re-
covered. 
It necessarily follows from the above stated cases and 
the evidence in this case that the court erred in not granting 
defendant motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint (R. 94) 
due to the fact that the plaintiff has utterly failed to prove 
any damages. Counsel for the defendant made a proper motion 
at that time, but the court denied said motion. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court that 
for the above stated and foregoing reasons that the trial court 
erred in granting the plaintiff damages based on the evidence 
before the court and as such the judgment should be reversed 
and an entry for nominal damages only be entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
13 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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